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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
• • • • 
STATE OF UTAH, ' : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
Case No. 
-vs- : 14248 
CRAIG DERRICKSON MARVELL,
 : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with one count of murder 
in the first degree in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-5-202 (Supp. 1975), for the murder of Michael Hogan 
during the commission or attempted commission of a burglary 
or kidnapping on or about April 9, 1975. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury in the Seventh 
Judicial District Court, in and for Carbon County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Edward Sheya, Judge, presiding, 
and was found guilty on August 8, 1975. As provided by 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1975) , a separate hearing 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
on sentence was then held- The appellant waived the jury 
and Judge Sheya heard evidence in aggravation and 
mitigation of sentence. On August 12, 1975, the 
Honorable Judge Edward Sheya sentenced appellant to 
death by shooting. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court 
affirming the judgment of the trial jury and the sen-
tencing court. In the alternative, if this Court 
determines that the death penalty as provided in 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1975), is unconsti-
tutional, respondent seeks an order remanding the 
case to the trial court solely to impose a sentence 
of life imprisonment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was charged, tried and convicted 
together with Gypsy Allen Codianna and Irvin Paul Dunsdon 
for the brutal murder of Michael Hogan on April 9, 
1975, in Carbon County, Utah. 
A strong and uncontradicted chain of 
physical evidence and testimony inculpated appellant 
and his co-defendants in the crime. 
The State's first witness, Norman Vaksinick, 
a Price City Police Officer, testified that he was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dispatched by radio to Michael Hogan's house at 12:30 a.m. 
on April 9, 1975 (Tr.68). When Officer Vaksinick arrived 
he observed two large spots in the driveway of Hogan's 
residence which appeared to be blood (Tr.69). He also 
found three expended .22 caliber shells in Hogan's drive-
way (Tr.69). 
The next witness, Highway Patrol Trooper Lagrand 
Wilberg, stated that he received a radio dispatch concerning 
an early model light green pickup truck with three or four 
occupants (Tr.97). This description had been provided by 
a neighbor of Hogan's/ Lee Heath, who heard gunshots from 
the direction of Hogan's driveway at approximately 12:30 
a.m. on April 9, 1975 (Tr.369), and saw a light green 
pickup pull away from Hogan's house shortly thereafter 
(Tr.37 0,37 6). Trooper Wilberg spotted the truck and 
followed it (Tr.98). He observed that there was blood on 
the left rear fender of the truck (Tr.101). He stopped 
the vehicle and ordered appellant and his co-defendants 
out of the truck (Tr.102). When they alighted he 
afiJ 
noticed that appellant^defendant Dunsdon had blood on 
their clothing (Tr.102-103). 
-3- . 
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Officer Wilberg discovered a partially 
disassembled .22 caliber rifle and several .22 caliber 
bullets behind the seat of the truck (Tr,103). He 
also found a piece of underwear soaked in blood in 
the truck (Tr.104). This piece of clothing was later 
shown to have been worn by Hogan when he was kidnapped 
(Tr.430) and the blood was the same type as Hogan's 
(Tr.315,321). Officer Wilberg then drove up Crandall 
Canyon with Sgt. Nordfelt of the Utah Highway Patrol 
(Tr.108). They followed fresh tire tracks up the 
canyon to a point where the tracks turned off the 
road (Tr.109). They found three distinct sets of foot-
prints (Tr.112), and the trail of something being 
dragged in the snow (Tr.lll). Following this trail, 
Wilberg and Nordfelt found Michael Hogan1s body still 
wet with blood (Tr.114). Officer Wilberg gave his 
opinion based on considerable practical experience 
that the tire tracks leading up the canyon matched the 
tires on appellant Dunsdon's truck (Tr.121). Officer 
Wilberg recovered a beer can near Hoganfs body which 
had a pink powder on it. The powder matched similar 
powder found in the truck used by appellant and his 
co-defendants (Tr.118,186). 
Sgt. Dennis Nordfelt then testified that he 
too observed three distinct sets of footprints in 
Crandall Canvon (Tr.142). He also gave his technical 
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opinion that the tire tracks in the canyon matched the 
tires on appellant Dunsdon' s truck (Tr.149), 
The next seven witnesses called by the State 
were police officers. They traced the chain of evidence 
relating to blood soaked clothing, tire molds, .22 
shells, and a beer can,from Price to the FBI Crime 
Laboratories in Washington D.C. and back (Tr.162-168). 
One of these witnesses, Sheriff Albert Passic of Carbon 
County also testified that he observed three sets of 
footprints in Crandall Canyon (Tr.219-220). 
Dr. Serge Moore, the State Medical Examiner, 
was the next witness. He stated that he removed thirteen 
projectiles from the victim's body (Tr.289). 
It was later definitively established that at 
least four of these bullets had been fired by the gun 
found in appellant Dunsdonfs truck (Tr.339,349). 
Dr. Moore gave the opinion that death could 
have been caused by several bullets and by manual 
strangulation (Tr.274,281). He further testified that 
the body had fifty deep contusions and abrasions (Tr.282). 
The State then produced the testimony of Elmer 
Miller, chief of the soils and minerals unit of the FBI 
Laboratory (Tr.295). Mr. Miller testified that the soil 
found in the truck used by appellants and the soil found 
on the beer can near Hogan's body were exactly alike when 
compared under a miscroscope of 300 power (Tr.299), 
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Alvin Hodge, a blood stain specialist from 
the FBI, testified that several pieces of clothing 
belonging to the victim and to appellant, including a 
ring of appellant's, had measurable quantities of type 
0 blood, which was Michael Hogan's blood type (Tr. 
309-323). 
The State also called FBI firearms identifica-
tion specialist, Richard Schmidt to testify. He stated 
that at least four of the bullets taken from the victim's 
body. Exhibit Nos. 10, 15, 16, and 17, could have been 
fired from no other gun in the world than the .22 caliber 
rifle found in the truck (Tr.350). 
Lee Heath, a neighbor of Michael Hogan's, 
testified concerning the events at Hogan's residence on 
April 9, 1975. He identified appellant Dunsdon 
as "Cowboy" and admitted knowing appellant 
(Tr.366-367). He mentioned seeing appellant 
and another man, Bruce Corkum, fighting with Hogan 
about three weeks before his death (Tr.367). Heath 
testified that he heard a gunshot at approximately 
12:30 a.m. April 9, 1975. He heard two more shots 
in quick succession (Tr.369). He saw two men near 
the rear of a 1957 or 1958 light green truck near 
Hogan's driveway (Tr.370). He stated that one of 
the men resembled appellant and that he 
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saw three men get into the truck and drive away (Tr.373-
374). Heath went down to the driveway to look for 
Hogan. He observed the two blood stains mentioned earlier 
and then called the police and gave a description of the 
truck (Tr.375-376) • He later identified the truck in 
the police yard as the same truck he had seen earlier at 
Hogan's (Tr.377). 
The State also called Ralph Muncy, Hogan's 
roommate, as a witness. Muncy testified that he heard 
loud knocking and a voice say, "Hey Hoagey, its me, 
Cowboy." (Tr.409). Hogan opened the door and a struggle 
ensued (Tr.411-419). Hogan called to Muncy for help and 
then was shot (Tr.421-422). Muncy went to the door to 
watch the truck drive away and then searched the area for 
Hogan and viewed the two spots of blood discovered by 
Heath (Tr.423,428). At trial, he identified the blood 
soaked underwear found in the truck as his own by the 
laundry mark on the clothing Hogan was wearing when he was kid-
napped (Tr.430). 
Appellant did not introduce any evidence and 
he did not present a defense. After deliberation the 
jury returned a verdict of guilty. 
At the hearing on sentence, appellant's case 
was more lengthy. 
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George Kourus, a good friend of appellant's, 
said that appellant was "high" from beer and drugs (T.505). 
He had no knowledge of the other co-defendants. It 
should be noted that Kourus was convicted of perjury for 
related testimony (See Codianna brief, point IV, App. A.) 
Tammy Dennis testified that she saw appellant 
drink beer and but could not say if he took pills or 
smoked marijuana (Tr.510-512). 
Appellant testified that he had a wife and 
four children (Tr.514-515). He claimed to have consumed 
beer, "downers," and marijuana at the party (Tr.516-518). 
Questioning by the court elicited that he was separated 
from his wife and had never sent her any money for support<T.529), 
Grant Smith, a psychologist, testified about 
the hypothetical effects of the synergism of beer and 
Valium (Tr.532-538). He admitted that variable physio-
logical characteristics like size, metabolic rate, and 
physical condition influence a drug's effect (Tr.547-548). 
He also admitted that his opinion was speculative and 
that he had no information concerning appellant's 
physical condition (Tr.546-552). 
The State presented several rebuttal witnesses, 
all police officers, who indicated that they observed 
appellant within an hour of the murder and did not 
observe that appellant was intoxicated or under the 
influence of drugs (Tr.618-638). 
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After the presentation of mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances the trial judge, acting 
as the sentencing authority, pursuant to appellant's 
waiver of the jury, sentenced appellant to death. 
Appellant now challenges the constitutionality and 
propriety of that sentence in this appeal. 
~9-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONDUCTED ITS VOIR 
DIRE OF THE PROSPECTIVE JURORS AND CORRECTLY DENIED 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SEAT A NEW PANEL. 
The basis of Witherspoon v. United States, 391 
U.S. 510, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770 (1968), is that 
a juror may not properly be excused from duty merely 
because he generally opposes the death penalty. 
"Specifically, we hold that a 
sentence of death cannot be carried 
out if the jury that imposed or 
recommended it was chosen by ex-
cluding veniremen for cause simply 
because they voiced general ob-
jections to the death penalty or 
expressed conscientious or religious 
scruples against its infliction." 
Id. 391 U.S. at 522 (Emphasis in the 
original text). 
This Court interpreted Witherspoon in State v. Redford, 
27 Utah 2d 379, 496 P.2d 884 (1972): 
"Witherspoon dealt with those jurors 
who had conscientious scruples against 
the death penalty but who could never-
theless impose it in a proper case. The 
statute involved in the Witherspoon case 
as set out in 391 U.S. 512, 88 S.Ct. 
1772 provided: 
In trials for murder it shall be 
a cause for challenge of any juror 
who shall, on being examined, state 
that he has conscientious scruples 
against capital punishment, or that 
he is opposed to the same. 
Challenges were exercised under 
the Illinois statute to all who had 
scruples against the death penalty -
regardless of whether or not they 
could impose it. This is what the 
Witherspoon case condemned." 
T-JI A c\c r> o/J a-h 8 8 7 _ 
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The instant case involves jurors who said they would not 
under any circumstance impose the penalty as provided 
by law for murder in the first degree. Footnote 21 in 
Witherspoon specifically states that it does not include 
jurors having this frame of mind: 
"We repeat, however, that 
nothing we say today bears upon 
the power of a State to execute 
a defendant sentenced to death 
by a jury from which the only 
veniremen who were in fact excluded 
for cause were those who made 
unmistakably clear (1) that they 
would automatically vote against 
the imposition of capital 
punishment without regard to any 
evidence that might be developed at 
the trial of the case before them, 
or (2) that their attitude toward 
the death penalty would prevent 
them from making an impartial 
decision as to the defendant's , 
guilt. . . ." Id. 391 U.S. at 522. 
(Emphasis in the original text) 
Appellant misconstrues the questioning of Lydia 
Palacios. The trial court asked (1) if any of the veniremen 
In the very recent case of Davis v. Georgia, 97 
S.Ct. 399 (1976), the United States Supreme Court re-
affirmed Witherspoon. In Davis, the petitioner was con-
victed of murder and sentenced to death by a jury that 
was selected in violation of the Witherspoon standards. 
The Court held that of a venireman is improperly excluded 
from a capital case, any subsequently imposed death 
penalty cannot stand. Respondent submits that Davis does 
not apply to the case at bar because there was no violation 
of Witherspoon. Davis does not proscribe a new test for 
voir dire of veniremen; it re-states the Witherspoon 
standards and mandates a reversal in the event of a 
vioation of Witherspoon and a resulting penalty of death. 
-11-
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had such feelings against capital punishment that 
they "could not or would not find a defendant guilty 
of first degree murder." (T. 15) and; (2) if any had 
such feelings that although they might be "willing and 
able to vote for a conviction of first degree murder 
would nevertheless be of such a frame of mind that 
[they] could not or [they] would not under any 
circumstance vote to impose the death penalty re-
gardless of what the evidence might be either as to 
the crime itself or any evidence offered to show 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances." (T. 16). The 
trial court excused one juror and conducted voir dire 
with a replacement then added: 
"THE COURT: All right, is there anyone else? 
JUROR: I never could. 
THE COURT: You never could under any 
circumstance regardless 
of what the evidence is? 
JUROR: I don't think I could. 
THE COURT: You think you understand the 
question do you? 
JUROR: Yes. 
THE COURT: The question is that under any 
circumstance, regardless of 
what the evidence is you never-
theless could not vote for 
capital punishment? 
JUROR: No. 
THE COURT: You couldn't do it? 
JUROR: No. 
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THE COURT: You may be excused. And what 
is your name? 
Lydia Palacios." JUROR: 
(T. 18,19). 
The questioning of Lydia Palacios was capably 
done by the court; the questions were clear and ob-
viously unbiased either toward innocence or guilt or 
toward leniency or death. From her first statement 
- "I never could" (T. 18) - to her last, Lydia Palacios 
was clear and unwavering in her conviction she could 
never vote for the death penalty. 
Similarly, Mrs. Alda Alger initiated her individual 
questioning: 
"MRS. ALGER: 
THE COURT: 
MRS. ALGER: 
THE COURT: 
MRS. ALGER: 
THE COURT: 
I would like to be excused. 
I don't believe I could. 
When did you get that notion? 
You have heretofore remained 
very silent, I just wonder 
when you got that. 
I was just sitting here and 
thinking and I feel, I deal 
with too many kids, I don't 
believe that I could. 
Regardless of what the evidence 
is? 
No, I don't want that responsi-
bility. 
I see. Well, I just want the 
record to be clear. What are 
you saying to me is now then 
that regardless of what the 
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evidence is, regardless of 
what the Court instructs you, 
that you nevertheless would 
absolutely not vote the 
death penalty, is that what 
) you are saying? 
MRS. ALGER: Well, I, Yes, that is what 
I am saying." 
(T. 20-21) . 
The California Supreme Court defined the test for 
an "unmistakeably clear11 statement by a juror which 
Witherspoon v. United States, supra, requires: 
"Whether an excluded prospective 
juror has given an answer which con-
stitutes the sort of unambiguous and 
'unmistakably clear1 statement of 
opposition to the death penalty which 
Witherspoon requires often depends 
upon whether there is any reasonable 
possibility that the juror construed 
the question to which he was re-
sponding in such a manner as to render 
his answer ambiguous in relation 
to the Witherspoon test-his willingness v 
to at least consider the death penalty 
in the case before him." People v. 
Williams, 79 Cal. Rptr. 65, 71 C.2d 614, 
456 P. 2d 633, 641 (1969). 
In the present case, the exclusion of Lydia Palacios and 
Mrs. Alda Alger was permissible under Witherspoon and 
People v. Williams, supra, because there is no reason-
able possibility they could have misconstrued the 
questions directed to them such that their replies were 
ambiguous in terms of the Witherspoon test. The trial 
court properly explained the procedures and requirements 
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in a capital case to all the veniremen, then questioned 
the individuals who indicated they had problems with 
that, and finally excused those who said they could not 
vote for the death penalty under any circumstances, 
regardless of the evidence. 
"It is the duty of the trial 
judge to see the the law is en-
forced; and since the juror with 
such conscientious scruples cannot 
be permitted to serve as a juror, 
there would arise a duty on the 
part of the court to excuse him, 
and there is no error if the order is 
made before a challenge is made. 
In fact, it would not be error on 
the part of the court to excuse such 
a juror even if both parties stipu-
lated that he might serve.11 
State v. Redford, supra, at 887. 
Appellant cites voir dire testimony wholly out 
of context to support his claim that Mr. Powell's response 
"If he was guilty, I could vote for" indicates he had 
a death bias. Prior to voir dire of Mr. Powell the 
trial court had asked if any of the jurors felt they 
would absolutely refuse to vote for the death penalty 
regardless of the evidence and regardless what the Court 
would instruct (T. 16-18, 20, 21). At no time did the 
court give the impression that the jurors had to favor 
capital punishment to decide the case; and in fact, the 
Court admonished one juror: 
"THE COURT: Well, I know, but a lot of 
us don't like the death penalty 
but if that is the law, and of 
course, you don't have to agree 
on the death penalty, you have 
two alternatives." (T.15) 
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Also, the Court did not say anything a juror could 
reasonably construe to mean that he ought to vote 
death if the defendants were found guilty. 
"THE COURT: A capital felony is punish-
able by either death or life 
imprisonment in this state 
. . . If such a verdict is 
returned, then under our law, 
and this is new to our state. 
This is new, comparatively new 
enactment. In the new penal 
code. Then there is a hearing 
by the same jury that tried the 
case to determine what the 
punishment should be. Whether 
it should be death or life 
imprisonment. And at that hearing 
evidence will be introduced either 
in aggravation or in mitigation 
of the punishment. In other 
words, you will hear witnesses 
telling you which penalty you 
should impose." (T. 13). 
Mr. Powell's voir dire testimony in no way suggested 
he had an unwavering bias toward the death penalty: 
"THE COURT: Would your answers be the same 
or would they differ in any 
respect to the answers given by 
the previous juror? 
MR. POWELL: They would differ, Your Honor. 
* * • . . * 
THE COURT: And could you tell me in what 
way? 
MR. POWELL: I think I could give a honest 
opinion and verdict. 
-16-
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THE COURT: 
MR. POWELL: 
THE COURT: 
MR. POWELL: 
* 
THE COURT: 
MR. POWELL: 
THE COURT: 
MR. POWELL: 
THE COURT: 
MR. POWELL: 
THE COURT: 
MR. POWELL: 
(T. 19-20), 
And do you have in mind the 
last two questions the Court 
put to the jurors? 
Yes I do. 
And you feel that you could vote 
for either, murder in the first 
degree even though later on at 
the other hearing you are to 
determine whether the penalty 
should be life or death, is that 
right? 
Yes, sir, Your Honor. 
Well, the last question is this, 
though you might be willing and 
able to vote for a conviction of 
the first degree, of first degree 
murder, would you nevertheless 
be of such frame of mind that 
you could not and would not under 
any circumstances vote to impose 
the death penalty regardless of 
what the evidence might be? 
If he was guilty I could vote for, 
You could, I see. You would 
follow the evidence in other 
words, is that correct? 
Yes, Your Honor. 
In determining whether to vote 
for life imprisonment or death? 
Yes, Your Honor. 
And, of course, you understand 
that, after there is a hearing, 
after the regular trial to 
determine the penalty? 
Yes. 
-i -, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant would also have us believe that juror 
Christensen was absolutely death oriented. Quite to the 
contrary, Mr. Christensen1s testimony, when taken in 
context, fails to show any death bias. His statement 
"If they are found guilty by the evidence I believe in 
capital punishment, so I could vote.1' (T. 22) was in 
response to the question the Court asked each juror; 
namely, would their feelings about capital punishment 
prevent them from voting to impose it regardless of 
the circumstances and regardless of the evidence. Mr. 
Christensen responded that the could vote for the penalty 
of death if the evidence warranted it. 
"THE COURT: You could vote for death if 
the evidence so warranted it, 
in other words? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: And based upon the hearing that 
is held after the regular 
verdict is in to determine the 
punishment? 
MR CHRISTENSEN: Yes, sir." 
(T. 22-23). 
The jury at appellant's trial was not "death-
qualified" but was neutral on the issue of the death 
penalty as per Witherspoon requirements. Appellant would 
have this Court decide that a prospective juror v/ho says 
she could never vote for death under any circumstances, 
should not be excused when clearly under Witherspoon she 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
would be excluded. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
addressed the problem regarding the make-up of the jury 
in a capital case in Koonce v. State, 456 P.2d 549 (Okl. 
Cr. 1969), vacated in part 408 U.S. 934, 33 L.Ed.2d 748 
92 S.Ct. 2845. 
"In keeping with the Witherspoon 
decision, it is apparent that the 
State is entitled to a jury which 
is neutral on the subject of penalty 
and it may challenge for cause a juror 
who would never consider returning 
a verdict of death. It is clear that 
the State is still entitled to a jury 
that is capable of imposing the death 
penalty. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 
88 S.Ct., at 1776; New Jersey v. Madden, 
245 A.2d at 23." 
Koonce v. State, supra, 456 P.2d at 555. 
Clearly the jury in appellant's case was neutral on the 
subject of penalty: all stated explicitly or to the 
effect that they could be fair, impartial, honest; and 
the only veniremen who were excluded were those who said 
they could not impose the death penalty under any cir-
cumstances, regardless of the evidence. 
In view of the fact that appellant was tried by 
a neutral jury, he had a choice between two fair and 
impartial bodies (the Court or the jury) as to who would 
determine his penalty. 
Therefore, in view of the foregoing arguments 
and authority, respondent submits that appellant's 
contentions are without merit and that his conviction 
should be affirmed. 
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POINT II 
THE FACT THAT NEITHER APPELLANT NOR HIS 
ATTORNEY WERE PRESENT DURING A SESSION IN CHAMBERS WHEN 
A CO-DEFENDANT MADE A MOTION TO SEVER WAS NOT REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
Prior to trial, the court took a noon recess 
after the jury had been questioned but not yet impaneled 
on August 4, 1975 (T. 37). During that recess counsel 
for the State, Mr. Boutwell, counsel for defendant 
Dunsdon, Mr. Wilson, and defendant Dunsdon met in 
chambers with Judge Sheya. At that time, and still 
prior to trial the prosecutor made a motion to sever 
as to defendant Dunsdon because tentative negotiations 
had been made whereby Dunsdon would plead guilty to 
second degree murder and testify for the State 
against the other two defendant (T. 38). After 
discussion, the Court denied the motion to sever, 
saying it was untimely, and the trial subsequently 
proceeded with all three co-defendants. 
Although the other two defendants and their 
counsel were not informed beforehand of the hearing 
on this motion, the court put the two co-defendants on 
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notice that some matter of lav/ had been discussed by 
the Court in their absence. Immediately after this 
hearing in chambers the Court reconvened with the 
jury, defendants/ and all counsel present. The judge 
first apologized for being late and went on to explain 
that "some of counsel were on consultation on a matter 
with the Court pertaining to this case." (T. 51). 
For reasons explained below the hearing prior to 
trial on the state's motion to sever did not create 
on appellant an absolute right to be present. Though 
the better practice would have been to have both co-
defendants and their counsel present their absence 
was not prejudicial and was not reversible error. 
The extent of the right of a defendant to be 
present or the right of a defendant to have his counsel 
present at a particular proceeding has been repeatedly 
confined to those proceedings in which absence of 
either the defendant, his counsel or both will pre-
judice defendant's rights or damage his ability to 
defend himself. 
The United States Supreme Court articulated the 
guideline for determining when the presence of a 
defendant is required by the due process clause. 
In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934), Justice 
-21-
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Cardoza stated: 
". * . [I]n a prosecution for 
a felony the defendant has the 
privilege under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to be present in his own 
person whenever his presence has 
a relation, reasonably substnatial, 
to the fullness of his opportunity 
;; to defend against the charge." Id. 
at 105. 
.In determining the scope of this right to 
be present the Virginia Supreme Court focused on the 
effect of the defendant's absence. Has the interest 
of the defendant been affected by the action of the 
judge? In Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 851, 
71 S.E.2d 377 (1952), the Virginia court answered this 
question by deciding that defendant's right was not 
violated when he was not present during drawing up 
of jury instructions. Although realizing the right to 
be present must be closely guarded the court added 
that it "must not be so enlarged as to exceed its true 
scope and thereby be made to include all inquiry into 
and consideration of purely legal matters by the trial 
judge which are in fact and reality merely careful and 
prudent preparation for resumption and conduct of the 
trial." Id. at 38 2. 
-22-
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This Court in State v. Aikus, 51 P.2d 1052 
(Utah 1935), a case cited in co-defendant Codianna's 
brief, acknowledged that "some courts hold that in 
short absences where a defendant has suffered no 
disadvantage by his absence or the court's action 
could not possibly result in prejudice it is not 
error." IdL at 1056. 
The right to have counsel present also 
evolves around the goal of avoiding prejudice. The 
Supreme Court in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 
(1967), stated that: 
" . . . our cases have construed 
the Sixth Amendment guarantee to 
apply to all 'critical' stages of the 
proceedings." (Emphasis added) Id. 
at 224. 
The Court then discussed different proceedings considered 
"critical" confrontations in addition to the actual 
in court trials and the importance of having counsel 
present at such times. The Court concluded that this 
principal "calls upon us to analyze whether potential 
substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in 
the particular confrontation and the ability of 
counsel to help avoid prejudice." Id. at 227. 
-23-
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The absence of appellant and his counsel 
during the hearing prior to trial on the State's 
motion to sever in the present case did not stifle 
appellant's ability to defend himself nor did it 
precipitate any prejudice against him. 
The motion to sever in fact was denied by 
the Court. In making this denial the court verbalized 
its concern for the two absent co-defendants and their 
possible inability to effectively defend if this 
motion were granted (Tr. 38-46). All of appellant's 
interests in arguing against this motion were thereby 
protected. 
It should here be noted that co-defendant 
Dunsdon had submitted a motion to sever more than a 
month before the trial commenced. The record does not 
show that appellant made any objection to that motion 
earlier. The protection given by the court at the 
hearing was much more beneficial for appellant than the 
inaction on the part of appellant, himself, concerning 
this same point earlier in the litigation. The appellant 
cannot and does not claim any prejudice or lack of 
opportunity to directly argue the pros and cons of this 
motion. 
Nor can appellant claim that he somehow was 
denied the "fullness of his opportunity to defend against 
the charge." As co-defendant Codianna admits, the jury Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The judge heard all these same allegations with much 
more specificity and accompanied by evidence in open 
court in the presence of appellant and his counsel. 
The fact that the judge sentenced co-
defendant Dunsdon to death, as he did the appellant 
and co-defendant Codianna , cements the fact that the 
court was not influenced or convinced by these arguments 
either in chambers or in open court and appellant was 
therefore in no way prejudiced by their being made 
in his absence. 
Both State v. Myers, 50 P.2d 41 (Utah 1973) 
and State v. Aikers, supra, cited and quoted in co-defendant 
Codiannafs brief dealt with defendants who had vol-
untarily absented themselves from their trials. 
This Court in both instances, found that the right 
to be present, even at a critical in-court stage, could 
be waived by defendant's action. The quote'from Aikers, 
supra, cited on page 8 of co-defendant Codianna1s 
brief may seem inconsistent with this holding unless it 
is realized that within the context of the opinion the 
first sentence of a quote seems to be a statement of 
the defendant's argument rather than a statement of lav/ 
as accepted by this Court. 
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POINT III 
THE SENTENCE OF DEATH IMPOSED ON APPELLANT 
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CON-
STITUTION OR ARTICLE I, SEC, 9 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The history of the United States Constitution 
and of United States Supreme Court decisions, including 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 
96 S.Ct. 2902 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S.Ct. 2909. 
(1976); and Jurek v. Texas, 96 S.Ct, 2960 (1975); 
clearly indicates that capital punishment is not per 
S6 cruel and unusual punishment. Respondent contends 
that the sentence imposed upon appellant is consistent 
with that history. 
The English Declaration of Rights of 1688 
pronounced "excessive bail ought not to be required, 
nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.,f 1 Wm. 
and Mary, 2nd Sess., 192 (1689) (Emphasis added). 
Scholars dispute the exact historical stimulus for the 
"criHl and unusual punishment" phrase, see Granucci, 
"Nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted". The 
original meaning, 57 Cal. L. Rev. 839, 852-860 (1969). 
But it is generally acknowledged that the prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment was directed at 
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punishments unauthorized for a crime and at egregiously : 
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The ontuo clriu;:-':, qc~e < t r;i.v, , v;c* late: incorporated 
i • ' • c T *• i - s^ *- d- e^ 1 ! ^ ' « h d e b & Le• 
i\\. t h e i. une t h e iM-;:-.'L A m e n d : e e e V n > a p p r o v e d *
 ; Lhe 
states, capital punishment was a coupon sanction for 
serious crimes. 
The United States Supreme Court: in the recent 
c;.'\s*. c v_fi.ecjCi
 v . vK;orc]u, , i..»ue... *;, a - J , • £ - - *' " * 
the view that the death penalty when imposed puvsunrt 
'. ' • a *: ("; oer or-ri r !•/* s t a f i •to rx r s e h eme a o ^  s *s •i v' el a 1 e 
t h e i;i'_,r:;.:i ;.taenu::ie:iu . ;•..- . . , :.;T • , i e. .• * i v 
in Gregg: • • 
.,--•. "Four years ago, the petitioners 
•". • in Furman and its companion cases 
predicated their argument primarily 
upon the asserted proposition that 
standards of decency had envolved 
to the point where capital punish- : 
merit no longer could be tolerated. 
The petitioners in those cases said, 
•'••." in effect, the evolutionary process 
had come to an end, and that standards 
•'of decency required that the Eighth 
•Amendment he construed finally as 
prohibiting capital punishment for 
any crime roqardlc-s <--r its depravit .y 
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:<:xri. impact on society. This view 
>;as accepted by two Justices 
rr.icnnan and Marshall] . Three 
Gt/iur Justices v;ere unwilling to go 
t'O far; focusing on the procedures by 
which convicted defendants were selected 
for the death penalty rather than on 
the actual punishment inflicted, they 
joined in the conclusion that the 
statutes before the Court were con-
stitutionally invalid. 
The petitioners in the capital 
cas-:3 before the Court today renew 
the 'standards of decency1 argument, 
but developments during the four years 
since Furman have undercut substantially 
the assumptions upon which their argu-
ment rested. Despite the continuing 
debate, dating back to the 19th century, 
over the morality and utility of capital 
punishment, it is now evident that a 
large proportion of American society 
continues to regard it as an appropriate 
and necessary criminal sanction. 
The most marked indication of society's 
endorsement of the death penalty for 
murder is the legislative response to 
Furman. The legislatures of at least 
3 5 states have enacted new statutes that 
provide for the death penalty for at least 
some crimes that result in the death of 
another person. And the Congress of the 
United States, in 1974, enacted a statute 
providing the death penalty for aircraft 
piracy that results in death. Those 
recently adopted statutes have attempted 
*£© address the concerns expressed by the 
Court in Furman primarily (i) by specifying 
the factors to be weighed and the proce-
dures to be followed in deciding when to 
impose a capital sentence, or (ii) by 
making the death penalty mandatory for 
specified crimes. But all of the post-
Furman statutes make clear that capital 
-30-
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punishment itself has not been re-
jected by the elected representatives 
of the people. . . . 
We ho]ri that the death penalty is 
not a form cd" punishment \haL may never 
be imposed, regardless of the cir-
cumstances of the offense, regardless of 
the character of the offender, and 
regardless of the procedure followed 
intrenching the decision to impose it." 
96 S.Ct. at 2923,2932. 
Respondent submits that the sentence imposed 
on e-:-'eI "! a*.: : . • •-;- = •• • i:.^';-;^ r -jni shment. under 
either the Llighuh Amendment- o! the hiiii ca Slates 
Constitution or A"LioLe J, i'ochior. ( oT th^ lita> 
C' \ri: i ' • a i. . vpp..1 • i » i! « : c o t . . i l /.v. . of 
F u r n a n , •" 0 ; u . c \ 2 ^ », '): L . r ^ ^ d jr 5 , '; / l \ ( f , 2V>r 
("I' ' x * '* '-'nr and fails to consider the explicit 
language OJ Gregg v. Georgia, supra. 
Finally, respondent discusses i n detail the 
h i s t o r i c a ] r a t i o i \ a 1 e a n d p o 1 :i c y a r g u rn e n t s s u p p o r f i n g 
the impositi on of the death penalty at Poi nt III of its 
brief ; > -:<yn.?^'y* > n r o -d^ff^rlx11 Codi<-nnn ' s h d ? r -p -
case ( '.r ,^ :pt f>^ • < <-\ , " d> , ,-. c, o *_ 
are therefore incorporated by reference herei n. • • 
-31 -
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POINT IV 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (SUPP. 1975) IS 
LAWFUL AND APPELLANT'S•SENTENCE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Respondent submits that the Utah death penalty 
statutes, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-202 and 76-3-207 (Supp. 
1973), are constitutional and-lawful and satisfy the con-
cerns of Furman v> Georgia, supra, as expressed in the 
recent United States Supreme Court decisions Gregg 
v. Georgia, supra, and Proffitt v. Florida, supra, 
as well as Jurek v. Texas, supra. The concerns mentioned 
in Furman centered around statutory attempts 
by the states to provide death penalty procedures 
which guided and controlled jury discretion and prevented 
the arbitrary and capricious iraposition of capital punish-
ment. The Court in Furman declined to give rigid guidelines 
for statutory schemes but did suggest certain acceptable 
parameters. As Mr. Justice Stewart wrote in Gregg at 
96 U.S. 2935: 
"As a general proposition these 
concerns [of Furman] are best met by 
a system that provides for a bi-
furcated proceeding at which the 
sentencing authority is apprised of 
the information relevant to the 
imposition of sentence and provided 
with standards to guide its use of the 
information. 
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'•'.• • '• Vve do not intend to suggest that • 
only the above-described procedures 
v7ould be permissible under Furman 
or that any sentencing system con-
structed along these general lines 
would inevitably satisfy the con-
cerns of .Furman,4^for .each distinct 
systera nusTE~*l3e"""exaiuined on an 
individual basis, . 
""TS^T^Ystem'^could have standards so 
vague that they would fail adequately 
to channel the sentencing decision 
patterns of juries with the result 
that a pattern of arbitrary and 
capricious sentencing like that 
found unconstitutional i n Furman 
coiPd ovorc " ." " ~ ~ •'.•.' 
Utab ' s CL . - :: 1. penalty sve.tuL-'.;, Utah Code Ann. 
'
,
".vj.
 ]
 '-'' \ -rov ide for a 
Mfurcated proceeding, require a fdnd'iu, of aggravating 
circumstances and articulate mitiga1- i n:j circumstances that 
can be presented ^-. L:: * senterici ng ai ithora ty. 
.CJ ' f ' • > i ' 
°up-f~cm * C'OtiL ' r e ' i a i i " tdn e t n i ^ i. o ; c t o r ^ d o a ^ h • 
e o n • 1 t / statu! ^ < t^ c ~>n ; ;i r V,.r ' nn R i ! " ' i • ( ;-;:i* United 
•nic^ter/ r ^ v i c r / f .vpjlai ( court0 ; 'M) \ r i U :n 
finding"- b*' the sentencing authori ty; and •' ') rpecir ic 
enumeration or stanaaras for aggravating c L -• eumiiucinc-o, 
3! MANDATORY REVIEW. 
.;.'• , T h e I J n i. t: e d S t a t e s S u p r em e C o 1 1 r t 1 I a s n e v e r 
held that d u e pvroces^ r e q u i r e s a st a t e no j-rov-i.cie an 
appella te sys tem, even in cr iminal cases. Ortwe i n v . 
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Schur;:^, "410 U.S. 656, 93 S.Ct. 1172/ 35 L.Ed.2d 572 
(1973), Ross v. Hoffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94, S.Ct. 2437, 
41 L.Ed.2 341 (1974). 
As the Ross Court noted: 
u[W]hile no one would agree that 
the State may simply dispense with 
the trial stage of proceedings 
without a criminal defendant's con-
sent, it is clear that the State 
need not provide any appeal at all. 
McKane v/.Durstqn, 153 U.S. 684 
(1894)." 417 U.S. at 611. 
The United States Supreme Court made no indication in 
Gregg, Proffitt or Jurek that it was overruling this 
basic concept or reversing its opinion in Ortwein and 
Ross. It is, therefore, logical to assume that a 
criminal statute is constitutional .without any provision 
at all for appellate review. 
An examination of the three recent United States 
Supreme Court cases from which appellant extrapolates 
his automatic review requirement shows that there is 
no constitutional mandate of appellate review in capital 
cases. ' "•'••.' 
I n Greggy supra, Mr. Justice Stewart reviewed 
the history of the death penalty and the United 
States Supreme Court's response to it. He summarized the 
central concerns of Furman and then narrowed his focus 
to the specific constitutionality of Georgia's death 
penalty statute. 
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• •••:•' : ' -:v)ll the} G- o L" • : ' ^ u t a , t he c o u r t 
noted ele-reats whiob el iminatad the possibiJ i ty of 
freakish and wanton imposition of the death par--?. tw v.hieh " 
Furman condemned. 95 S.Ct f a t >•; a. , aria cour:; m.-\,LLioaad 
Lin; i/c"!u*:iau of {to Gooruia' 5; automat ".c icivipv,- provision and 
su:;gesc-;a i. • . . p- - ' - i ' • " • addlimo.auL 
safc-gna^d against th^ r;;coss:s r-ossihle under- the pre-
"h-pl\ that an aalcmu _c rcvic// p vudbio 1 would 
be necessary lor coh:!^ hi' ion' 1 < - ' • ( ^  language of the 
decision mrkos cle^r * no i • - t. • ' . , j < • - •_ _ •.: 
c>r * 'eqa»^^:- r r . v i o i , \ , u s h e l p f u , o .a : o o f a a e r a j a b l e , b u t 
_ . d •: , 1 - ' ' ' u p / r . . 9 6 S.C i : , 
a t 2 9 C I : 
"'rhe new Georgia sentencing pro-
coduras, by contrast, focus the jury's 
attention on the particularized nature 
of the cri.no and the particularized 
characteristics of the individual 
defendant. VJhile the jury is permitted 
to consider any aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances^ it must find and identify 
at least one statutory aggravating 
factor before it may impose a penalty -\ y .- :'. 
of death. In this v;ay th€3 jury's 
discretion is channeled.. No longer 
can a jury wantonly and freakishly 
impose the death sentence; it is • 
a] ways circumscribed by the legislative' 
guidelines. In addition, the review 
function of the Supreme Court of Georgia 
affords additional assurance that the 
concerns that prompted our decision in 
Furman are not present: to any signi-
ficant degree in the Georgia procedure 
••'•'_ - applied here.11 (Emphasis added.) 
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Appellant cites Proffitt, supra, as an 
indication that automatic review of death penalty 
cases is constitutionally required. Again, while the 
United States Supreme Court condoned the automatic review 
system of Florida it did not suggest that such an 
appellate review structure was constitutionally necessary 
under Furman. 
The Texas capital punishment statute which was 
upheld in Jurek v. Texas, supra, also provides for auto-
matic review. However, the United States Supreme Court again 
declined in that case, as- in Gregg and\Proffitt, to hold that 
mandatory review is necessary in capital cases. It 
should be noted that Art. 1.14 Te>:as Code of Criminal 
Procedure allows a defendant to waive "any rights secured 
him by law except the right of trial by jury in a 
capital felony case." It is conceivable therefore that 
an individual could be convicted and executed under Texas 
law without the automatic review required by Texas 
statu be. . . • • 
Utah's death penalty statutes do not require 
automatic review by this Court. Respondent maintains that 
the absence of automatic review does not render Utah's 
capital punishment laws constitutionally invalid. As 
respondent argued above, due process does not require 
-36-
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any k '.nd of appellate revie w i i i cr :i : ai r ia 1 cases... Utah 
CIOG5; provide for apoallate review in the discretion of • 
c o i i v i c t e d :i i i d i v i d i i: i ] a n d a r i a p p e a 1 has c 1 e a r 1 y b e e n 
taken by appellant in the present case. Furthernore, 
' - ^ Code Am i. § 76 -2-207(3) (S'-nn. .197:0, provides; 
"dpon any appeal by Lhe defendant 
where the sentence is of death the 
supreme court, if it finds prejudicial 
error", in the sentencing proceeding 
only, may set aside the sentence of 
death and remand the case to the trial 
cour I:, in v/hich event the trial court 
shall impose the sentence of life 
imprisonment." 
Thi s proviso on C i rects the Utah Sup} : erne Coi n: t I : i \ take • 
! >'evlov of sentencing i n capitcil c a s e s . It instructs 
...I;.:.,; • ,• • • '.:.-.:.li .-: id. ."*."d '"'••-': "i : - proceedings for 
prejudicial error, vd:'"d clearly m^v include inter alia, 
» ousido.aLion or the pro'orhiuiinli Lv of app _>llar:L ' s 
:"'aarico as c o m p a r e 1 :• * ' • i > t » s h ^ "e received the 
do^Lh panrOLy. The sta.ruLory provision quoted above 
d - *:- V- '"-'; c i , : of f)taLe v. j;teijfo£_eh, 7u it': 
t O , ;i . , Hi, : . \om^ r !"! c; "" th' <d ah ft:o 
Co;;^t [<> sua s p o n t e c o n s i d e r nan iCes l - and p r e j u d i c i a l 
• • -< f - ' r ; ' ••• ;o-riO'd nor a s s i g n e d , 
provide- ;-n a p p e l l a t e r e v i e w s L r u c L u : o v - u c ] . i n s u r e s t h e 
f a i r a.'i r a L i o n e l impos i L:i on of th-" d r o b h : r ^ n o ] b / . 
ft p e r s o n s e n t e n c e d ; * ' < . . . _ • 
a l t e r n a t i v e s c o s s ^ r n i n j r e v i e w . F l t s L , h" f\in vraivo t h e 
- - ~ ! 7 -
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right to review and accept the penalty imposed,, as we 
submit can be done under the statutes in Texas, which 
were upheld in Jurek v. Texas, supra. When the waiver is knowing, 
competent and intelligent it allows a person to forgo 
the appellate process. Such a waiver received approval 
by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Bessie 
Gilrnore v. Utah. , No. A-453 (Dec, 1976). In that case 
the Court decided that standing was determinative of any 
resolution of the questions before it> The Court ruled 
that Mrs. Gilrnore, the mother of the condemned man, had 
no standing to petition the Court in behalf of her son, 
Gary Gilrnore, and therefore denied her petition.for a 
stay of his execution. The Court's decision was also 
grounded on the fact that Gilrnore made a knowing and 
intelligent waiver of his right to appeal. The Gilrnore 
case presented an unprecedented opportunity for the United 
States Supreme Court to hold that automatic, mandatory 
review of death penalties was constitutionally re-
quired. However, it did not hold or suggest that the 
Utah Supreme Court was obligated to review Gilmore's 
case. Rather, the Court implied that appeal, even in 
capital cases, may be discretionary with the defendant. 
The clear impression of the Court's ruling was that an 
appeal can be waived and review of a capital case fore-
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closed by a defendant in a death penalty case. ' Such 
strong dicta indicates that mandatory review as suggested 
h\' appellant is not; a constitutional necessity in capital 
cases. .. • - ••; . • 
.Second] y; as an alternative a person sentenced to 
death in Utah cai i appeal his conviction and sentence as 
appellant b -° don^ in h^»:. cu- ,). 17M->n ri^ ayr"oa] is- < 'Vc,^ 
Utah Code J\:. > • ^ t-M.u \ . ,-y crji "ich, \ipra, 
provide for h comprehensive review o^ th "* entire case. 
Appellant ! s • • : • • : i • • : • • > T> '' : - -* •" • - b ^ , / 
is constitutionally fcibal, is preua Lir^ e anl unsupported • 
Appellant has not been denied appelate review and a ease 
mandates reviev; of capituiJ cases . ..ii.. ,g p L > an v • v seeive 
a 11 that he wou 1 d have receivad un:1or a nt'dile renincinr; 
mandatory reviev;. Because appellant has siu f ec-a : .a, . y 
or prejudice because of the absence e r- ai: :-o •* > t5 c r<" • -. v 
in. Utah's statutory scheme, his clair r,f unoonsf i. tut \ crw:l i ty 
is moot and hypothesized, is inapplicable to him, and 
should be rejected. ; . . 
Appellant has failed to establish that mandatory 
review of death penalty cases is required by \ b<- Constitution 
or the recent cases of Gregg. Prof fitt, an---; ^ m fa-w >e 
has lib-;ise failed •''. b-» "o -bra-'s statutory death 
tections. , . • ' • • 
T h e ' u n d a r n o n t a l a u e s t i o 7 If : u a ^ s w s r o d conce>:n i^ ;{ 
t h e c » n s 11 Liti j-oru; I :. t y - v.c l •_ p . iua ' - . / s : a L m e s w a s e s L a i ' . i i s h e d 
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is whether jury discretion is so unguicled as to result 
in capricious, discriminatory, wanton, or freakish 
sentences. As an example Justice Douglas condemned 
certain statutes under consideration in Furman because 
they were "pregnant with discrimination11 and therefore 
incompatible with.equal protection which is "implicit 
in the ban on cruel and unusual" punishment* 
Justice Stewart concluded at 408 U.S. 310 that, 
"the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate 
the inflection of a sentence of death under legal 
systems that permit their unique penalty to be so 
wantonly and so freakishly imposed." (Emphasis added.) 
Justice VJhite referred to the infrequent and 
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty for rape and 
murder as the primary reason for its invalidity in the 
case considered under Furman. The new death penalty 
statutes of many states attempt to eliminate the un-
fettered and wanton discretion formerly given to judges 
and juries in order to prevent the capricious and discrimina-
tory imposition of the death penalty condemned by Furman. 
Respondent submits that Utah's death penalty 
statutes meet the affirmative test of Furman by adequately 
guiding and directing jury discretion in a constitutionally 
permissible way. 
-40-
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The Leah statutes dealing with.capital offense* 
end the imposition of the death penalty were pre-
pared to prevent their invalidation by h'^ hhii: and to 
g u a r d a g a i n s t the uncontrolled, u n 1 i ::i i t e d d i s c r e t i o n 
whicl i leads to discriminatory and caorious sentencing. 
Th- Utrih ie il;v'. ' w~>ro era a . d to nav>ow and 
c;u-'de the discretion or LIIL- seriLonc: :..< authority l^ 
ir.^ .or" 'ho driaLh i;'>: ;n tv o d v 'or the road o diraseous 
an., 5 .-• ;.•_:_., types c~ w^ 1 . u I and lr.ie:'1 K^' -. or h*-. 
' T ^'roplo, a ee^ e:;larh: cvn onlv h r co^vh;Led of a 
capi'.. *: 'i.-icr • uh^ :....: dv a . co dJ — "•' -1 d'-x e.-e 
••' Lhe '-'i^ ravdlirc; c i rcrrs cancea enunorated :n L tah 
o •'- . , '.'". -c; -eA - . J "W , iy:.r- ;dhtei his 
conviction, the defendant is provioed WJL-.. tnree steps 
Let-'e^n corvic'-.iop ;,r:l inposi t:I on c>' the do-d h penalty. 
j •!>'. -' • w v< dh , -- f Lgijoo ds ^e/on1' id v . ' ' ' 
syst'V to orotecL hi: rrcr. death where a leas harsh 
punishment naigh t be sufficient. 
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2. WRITTEN FINDINGS> 
Appellant also argues that because Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1975), does not require written 
findings by the sentencing authority meaningful appellate 
review is precluded and the possiblity of capricious and 
arbitrary death penalties is permitted. Appellant bases 
this argument on an anlysis of Section 76-3-207, supra, 
and the language of the United States Supreme Court in 
Gregg, supra, and Proffitt, supra. 
Respondent submits that Utah's death penalty 
statutes satisfy the concerns of Furman, supra, by guiding 
and controlling sentencing discretion. Furthermore, the 
Gregg, Proffit and Jurek decisions do not establish 
written findings as a constitutional necessity and 
appellant's reliance on these cases for such a proposition 
is unjustified. 
As previously noted, under (1), in Gregg, supra, 
Mr. Justice Stewart focused on the elements of the Georgia 
statute which eliminated the possibility of freakish and 
wanton imposition of the death penalty which Furman condemned. 
96 S.Ct. at 2936. It must be emphasized that the Georgia 
statutes did not delineate mitigating circumstances and did 
not require any findings, written or otherwise, concerning 
-42-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the consideration of mitigating factors by the sentencer, 
yet they were upheld by the Court, 
Utah's statutes, in comparison, require that at 
least one of several enumerated aggravating circumstances be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt as an essential element of 
first degree murder. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 and 76-1-501 
(Supp. 1975). See also In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 364 (1970). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1975), then, prescribes 
which mitigating circumstances must be considered be the 
sentencing authority, including any fact in mitigation of 
the penalty. The sentencing authority must then weigh the 
aggravating circumstances against the mitigating factors to 
determine penalty. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207(3) (Supp. 1975), provides 
that the Utah Supreme Court will review the entire sentencing 
proceeding in search of prejudicial error. Such a review 
would include a fresh consideration and separate balancing 
of the aggravating elements presented by the state and miti-
gating circumstances emphasized by a defendant. This pro-
cedure together with the requirement of proving aggravating 
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and enumeration of 
mitigating factors constitutionally directs and describes 
sentencing discretion. Such a statutory scheme is not 
constitutionally impermissible under the holding of Gregg. 
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The Florida death penalty statute considered in 
Proffit, supra, requires written findings and autonatic review. 
The holding of Proffitt does not, however, mandate or 
suggest that either provision is necessary for consti-
tutional validity. Neither written findings nor dis-
cretionary appellate review has ever been mentioned as 
a constitutional requirement in criminal cases. Ortwein 
v, Schurak, 410 U.S. 656, 93 S.Ct. 1172, 35 L.Ed.2d 
572 (1973); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 
41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974). 
The Texas capital punishment statute which was 
approved in Jurek v. Texas, supra, provides that the 
jury must answer in the affirmative three questions 
concerning sentence as they are relevant to the specific 
case under consideration. The court found that the three 
questions were the functional equivalent of mitigating 
circumstances and reasoned that: 
,f
. . . the constitutionality of 
the Texas procedures turns on whether 
the enumerated questions allow considera-
tion of particularized mitigating 
factors." 96 U.S. at 2956. 
It is important to note that the pivotal question 
for constitutional purposes was whether the three questions 
allowed "consideration of particularized mitigating factors." 
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(Er:hasis added.) There is no mention or intimation 
that persuasive mitigating factors must be written down 
or referred to by the jury. Any number of factors 
could be considered by a jury in answering the three 
questions* All that is required by Jurek and its 
companion cases is that mitigating circumstances be 
heard and weighed. As the Court concluded in Jurek: 
"Texas law essentially requires 
that one of five aggravating circum-
stances be found before a defendant 
can be found guilty of capital-murder, 
and that in considering whether to 
impose a death, sentence the jury may be 
asked to consider whatever evidence of 
mitigating circumstances the defense 
can bring before it. It thus appears 
that, as in Georgia and Florida, the 
Texas capital-sentencing procedure guides 
and focuses the jury's objective considera-
tion of the particularized circumstances 
of the individual offense and the individual 
offender before it can impose a sentence of 
death." 96 U.S. at 2957. 
Appellant contends that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 
fails to incorporate mandatory language requiring proper 
consideration of mitigating factors. This contenture ignores 
the clear meaning of the Utah statute. Section 76-3-207(1) 
states (inter alia): "mitigating circumstances shall include 
the following:. . . . " This language indicates that the 
sentencing authority must consider and weigh the six enumerate::! 
mitigating factors plus any other fact in mitigation 
whether it is presented or not. The intent of this language 
is more affirmative and mandatory than the permissive tone of 
the United States Supreme Court quoted above discussing 
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presentation of mitigating circumstances in Jurek. 
A reading of the transcript in the present case 
shows that appellant presented several factors in 
mitigation of his penalty (Tr.514-520; 529-530; 596-597). The 
Court balanced these factors against the aggravating 
circumstances presented by the state and decided that 
in light of all the evidence the death penalty should 
be imposed. Appellant has cited no case or authority 
which requires that sentencing body to give more weight 
to mitigating factors than to aggravating circumstances 
as appellant's argument seems to suggest. The 
sentencing court's action in the instant case is in no 
way prejudicial to appellant. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 
(3) directs this Court to review the entire sentencing 
proceeding. Such a review focuses this Court's attention 
on mitigating factors and contemplates a consideration 
of the proportionality of appellant's sentence as compared 
with others who have received the death penalty. The 
statutory provision quoted above coupled with the Utah 
case of'state_vi_Stenback, 78 Utah 350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931), 
which allows the Utah Supreme Court to sua nponte consider 
manifest and prejudicial errors on review which were 
neither argued or assigned provide an appellate review 
structure which insures the fair and rational-imposition 
of the death penalty. 
_Afi~ 
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Appellant has failed to establish that written 
findings by the sentencing authority in capital cases is 
required by the recent cases of Gregg, Proffitt and Jurek, 
Moreover, he has failed to show how the sentencing court's 
decision and reasoning in the instant case has prejudiced 
him or removed from present appellate review any 
information or consideration relevant to appellant's 
sentence. Therefore, appellant's claim that Section 
76-3-207, supra, is unconstitutional is unwarranted and 
should be rejected. 
_ A 1 _ _ 
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3
- AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES» 
Appellant alleges that Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-3-207 
(Supp. 1975), does not provide standards for aggravating 
circumstances but merely makes reference to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-202 (Supp. 1975), which delineates the elements of 
murder in the first degree. This allegation ignores the 
clear meaning of Utah statutes and United States Supreme 
Court case law concerning elements of a crime and burden 
of proof in criminal cases. 
Utah's statutes require that at least one 
of several enumerated aggravating circumstances by 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt as an essential element of 
first degree murder. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 and 76-1-501 
(Suop. '1975). See also In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 364 (1970). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1975), then, prescribes 
which mitigating circumstances must be considered be the 
sentencing authority, including any fact in mitigation of 
the penalty. The sentencing authority must then weigh the 
aggravating circumstances against the mitigating factors to 
determine penalty. 
Section 76-5-202, supra, lists aggravating 
circumstances which are necessary elements of murder in the 
first degree. In re Winship, supra, and Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-501 (Supp. 1975), require that elements of a crime be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the state. 
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The Florida statutory scheme imposing the death 
penalty which was approved in Proffitt, supra, does not 
require a standard of proof for aggravating circumstances 
which is as rigorous as Utah's* As the United States 
Supreme Court noted in Proffitt: 
"At the conclusion of the hearing 
the jury is directed to consider f[w]hether 
sufficient mitigating circumstances exist 
. . . which outweigh aggravating circumstances 
found to exist; and . . . [b]ased on those 
considerations, whether the defendant should 
be sentenced to life [imprisonment] or 
death.11 §§ 921.141 (2) (b)-(c) (Supp. 1976-
1977). The jury's verdict is determined by 
majority vote. It is only advisory; the 
actual sentence is determined by the trial 
judge. The Florida Supreme Court has stated, 
however, that ' [i]n order to sustain a 
sentence of death following a jury recommenda-
tion of life, the facts suggesting a sentence 
of death should be so clear and convincing 
that virtually no reasonable person could 
differ." Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 
910 (1975). Accord, Thompson v. State, 328 
So.2d 1, 5 (1976). Cf. Spinkellink v. State, 
313 So.2d 666, 671 (1975). 
The trial judge is also directed to 
weigh the statutory aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances when he determines the sentence 
to be imposed on a defendant. The statute 
requires that if the trial court imposes a 
sentence of death, "it shall set forth in 
writing its findings upon which the sentence 
of death is based as to the facts: (a) [t]hat 
sufficient [statutory] aggravating circumstances 
exist . . . and (b) [t]hat there are insuf-
ficient [statutory] mitigating circumstances 
. . . to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.! 
§ 921.141(3) (Supp. 1976-1977)." 96 S.Ct. 
2965. 
This language indicates that the sentencing judge 
in a capital case in Florida need not find that aggravating 
circumstances are present beyond a reasonable doubt. Never-
theless, the United States Supreme Court determined that the 
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Florida statute met the "constitutional deficiencies 
identified in Furman" "because the sentencing judge is 
required to focus on the circumstances of the crime and 
the character of the individual defendant before imposing 
sentence. 
Respondent submits that its death penalty 
statutes require a more stringent burden for aggravating 
circumstances than was required in Proffitt and are 
therefore valid under Furman. Moreover, appellant fails 
to show that the State did not meet its burden on 
aggravating circumstances nor does he suggest what an 
acceptable standard might be. 
In conjunction with his argument concerning 
standards for aggravating circumstances appellant alludes 
to factors in mitigation of his sentence which he alleges 
the court did not sufficiently consider in fixing sentence. 
Respondent submits, on the other hand, that 
the uncontradicted statement of co-defendant Dunsdon at sen 
tencing and corroborating evidence established that 
appellant shot Michael Hogan outside of Hogan's house 
(Tr.422, S.588). Appellant then helped put Hogan 
in Dunsdon's truck (Tr.422, S. 589). When the men 
arrived in Crandall Canyon appellant and his codefendants 
dragged Hogan off the road and appellant shot him eleven 
more times, killing him (S. 590). 
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The judge heard and considered the mitigating 
factors presented by appellant and weighed them against 
the above mentioned aggravating circumstances of the 
crime. 
Appellant testified that he had no prior criminal 
record. Respondent sees no information from the record 
refuting this testimony. Appellant also testified that 
he was married and has four children (S. 514-515). 
Appellant further testified that he had been separated 
from his wife for over a year and admitted that he had 
not sent any money during his absence to his family (Tr.529). 
Appellant's testimony concerning the effect on 
his memory of the beer and drugs he allegedly consumed at Tammy 
Dennis's party are subject to the same flaws of credibility 
as were present in defendant Codianna's testimony. Appellant's 
testimony on this matter was self-serving, conjectural and 
contradicted by the testimony of Officers Wilberg (S.628-
630), and Simpson (S.624). It was within the court's 
permissible discretion to accord very little weight to this 
part of appellant's testimony. 
Appellant questions whether anyone would 
accompany a revengeful stranger on an escapade of murder. 
Substantial evidence establishes that appellant did and 
he presented no defense to explain his bizarre conduct. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant cites Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 
(1953), which concerns testimony of accomplices, to 
show that defendant Dunsdon's statements about 
appellant's actions should have received little 
weight. Section 77-31-18 provides only that a 
"conviction shall not be had" on the uncorroborated 
testimony of an accomplice, Dunsdon's testimony in 
this case came after a conviction had been made. 
The judge properly heard the statement at the sentencing 
hearing and determined its weight in light of its 
source and possible motivation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (Supp. 1975), 
satisfies the concerns of Furman as reiterated in 
Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek, by effectively describing 
the parameters of sentencing discretion. The statute 
provides for a bifurcated proceeding, it requires proving 
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt and 
it directs the sentencing authority to consider mitigating 
factors. Subsection (3) of Section 76-3-207 coupled with 
Utah case law concerning the scope of appellate review 
Stenback, supra, allows the kind of review condoned in 
Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek. Appellant's sentence in this 
case is constitutional and appropriate. It is supported 
by the facts of the case and reflects the reasoned judgment 
of the Utah legislature and should therefore be upheld. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing points and authorities, 
respondent submits that the appellant's conviction 
and sentence were proper and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS. 
Assistant Attorney General 
23 6 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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